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ABSTRACT: The experience of tonal relations elicits different emotions of stability in listeners. Thus, 
tonality can be understood as a tool of emotional communication. For many semioticians every com­
municative phenomenon should be explained in terms of the sign theory. However, the pre-conceptual 
character of emotions of stability raises doubts about the applicability of a semiotic framework as 
a means of interpreting tonality. According to the author’s opinion, the applicability of a semiotic 
framework in music research is useful only if there is a single system for generating meaning in the 
brain, which is engaged in the processing of all kinds of meanings in language, music, and other com­
municative phenomena. Both music and language are complex phenomena which, in fact, share many 
communicative mechanisms. Nevertheless, they also possess traits which are specific solely to each. 
If the evolution of music and language branched out at some point in the anthropogenesis, some of 
music’s communicative features (among them tonality) would have become domain-specific. This 
means that the interpretation of a tonal message is based on another rule, and not the one involved in 
the interpretation of meaning in language. Thus, interpreting the message of tonality in terms of the 
semiotic sign theory is not a legitimate procedure. From this point of view, the only way of applying 
the semiotic framework to research into tonality is to understand signs in a purely functional sense, 
independent of the process of interpretation. Such an understanding of signs necessitates, however, 
a reformulation of semiotics.
*
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Introduction
Undoubtedly, one of music’s crucial functions is to serve communica­
tion.1 Therefore, it is no surprise that music has become a research subject of se­
miotics understood as a study of communication by means of signs. However, from
1 Cf. Anna Czekanowska, “U podstaw przesiania muzycznego: imperatyw dialogu czy potrzeba 
piękna,” in Muzyka w kontekście kultury, ed. Melecka T.S.K., Janicka-Słysz M. (Kraków: Aka­
demia Muzyczna w Krakowie, 2001), 575-88., Maciej Jabłoński and Piotr Podlipniak, “Musie 
as a Medium of Communication. Two Visions of Musicology,” Interdisciplinary Studies in 
Musicology, no. 7 (2008). David J. Hargreaves, Raymond A.R. MacDonald, and Dorothy Miell, 
“How do People Communicate Using Music?,” in Musical Communication, ed. Dorothy Miell,
the behavioral point of view, people communicate by means of music in a specific 
way. Although there are definitely cross-cultural differences in the scope of musical 
communication,2 the culturally insurmountable restriction of music seems obvious 
as far as the exchange of meaning is concerned. The restriction is evident if one 
contrasts music with natural language. Music and language are often compared 
on the assumption that both are culturally elaborated phenomena which belong 
to human universals.3 The comparison of these two phenomena is all the more 
reasonable since among the forms of vocal communication specific to humans only 
music and language represent the complex, generative form of communication4 
known as the “Humboldt system”.5 Moreover, as far as it is known, this kind of 
communicative complexity is observed solely in our species,6 which suggests that 
humans are endowed with some specific communicative abilities related to these 
two phenomena. All these observations provide grounds for the claim that music 
and language are the most advanced forms of human communication. Nevertheless, 
the specificity of language consists in the transmission of propositional meaning 
which is all but absent in music. As a consequence, music seems to be much more 
ambiguous than language even if language is used in an intentionally specific way, 
as in the case of poetry.7 This fundamental difference between music and language 
causes some difficulties for every semiotic approach to music.
Raymond A.R. MacDonald and David J. Hargreaves (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 1-25.
2 Cf. Jerome Lewis, “A  Cross-Cultural Perspective on the Significance of Music and Dance to 
Culture and Society: Insight from BaYaka Pygmies,” in Language, Music, and the Brain: A My­
sterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Striingmann Forum Reports, 45-65.
3 Cf. Donald E. Brown, Human universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
4 Aniruddh D. Patel, “Sharing and Nonsharing of Brain Resources for Language and Music", 
in Language, Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Striin­
gmann Forum Reports, 329-55.
5 “Humboldt systems” are “[...] systems which generate infinite diversity by finite means [...]. 
[...] [T]he phenomenal diversity of forms exhibited by these systems is based upon the fact that 
the combining elements on which they are based, be they atoms, genes or phonemes/morphe­
mes, are discrete and do not blend by averaging their properties on combining as do many other 
phenomena in nature, such as coloured liquids or quantities of heat.” Björn Merker, “Music: The 
Missing Humboldt system,” Musicae Scientiae, 6/3 (2002), 4.
6 Björn Merker, “Is There a Biology of Music, and Why Does it Matter?,” in Proceedings 
o f the 5th triennial conference o f the European Society fo r  the Cognitive Sciences o f Music 
(ESCOM): Hanover University o f Music and Drama, September 8-13, 2003, ed. Reinhard 
Kopiez (Hanover: Inst, for Research in Music Education, 2003), 402-5.; W.T. Fitch and Klaus 
Zuberbiihler, “Primate Precursors to Human Language: Beyond Discontinuity,” in Evolution 
of Emotional Communication: From Sounds in Nonhuman Mammals to Speech and Music in 
Man, ed. Eckart Altenmüller, Sabine Schmidt and Elke Zimmermann, 1st ed., Series in affective 
science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 26-48.
7 Ian Cross, “Music and meaning, ambiguity and evolution,” in Musical Communication, ed. 
Dorothy Miell, Raymond A. R. MacDonald and David J. Hargreaves (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 27-43.
According to many semioticians the main goal of semiotics is to deliver a use­
ful framework8 applicable in all possible studies of meaning,9 and music research 
is, after all, one of such studies. This assumption leads, however, directly to the 
fundamental question of the nature of musical meaning, which in turn is related to 
the more general issue of the human brain’s interpretative function. As participants 
in the debate on the relationship between language, music and the brain, initiated 
by Michael A. Arbib, have recently emphasized, there are two possible solutions 
to the issue of musical meaning in so far as semiotic reasoning is linked to brain 
research. Either the different forms of meaning — e.g. prepositional and affective
— are processed by distinct neural systems, or a single meaning-creating system is 
engaged in the processing of all kinds of meanings in language, music, and action.10
Because the generation of meaning (i.e. the interpretation of signs) is always 
based on brain processes, only the latter solution justifies the application of one 
semiotic framework in order to explain all forms of communicative systems. The 
challenge in the application of such a framework is to demonstrate that the inter­
pretative capabilities of people emerged as a result of a single system for creating 
meaning in the human brain. This system should be understood as an essential 
evolutionary innovation of Homo sapiens or our closest ancestors. According to 
Deacon, for example, in the course of evolution, structural changes occurred in the 
brain’s motivational systems which made this general interpretative function possi­
ble.11 From this perspective, music and language represent “ [...] different regions of 
a language-music continuum’12 or “ [...] different aspects of the same domain [... ]’13 
rather than two separate phenomena.
8 Some semiotitians believe that a new “grand semantic theory” will regain authority and 
“[...] will transcend the discussion of just one cognitive capacity, or just one symbolical form” 
(Mihailo Antovic, “Linguistic semantics as a vehicle for the semantics of music,” in Proceedings 
o f the Conference on Interdisciplinary Musicology (CIM04), ed. Richard Parncutt, Annekatrin 
Kessler and Frank Zimmer (Graz: University of Graz, 2004), 11).
9 From this perspective the framework is not restricted only to the human specific commu­
nicative systems but should be applicable to all possible forms of communication observed in the 
living world (cf. Thomas A. Sebeok, Perspectives in Zoosemiotics (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).; 
Dario Martinelli, Zoosemiotics: Proposals fo r a handbook, Acta semiotica Fennica 26 (Imatra: 
International Semiotics Institute, 2007).
10 Uwe Seifert et al., “Semantics of Internal and External Worlds,” in Language, Music, 
and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann Forum Reports, 
203-29, 214.
11 Terrence William Deacon, The symbolic species: The Co-evolution o f Language and the 
Brain, 1st ed. (New York: W .W. Norton, 1998).
12 Uwe Seifert et al., “Semantics of Internal and External Worlds,” in Language, Music, 
and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann Forum Reports, 
203-29, 214.
13 Michael A. Arbib, “Five Terms in Search of a Synthesis,” in Language, Music, and the 
Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann Forum Reports, 3-44, 21.
Identifying the distinct neural system or systems responsible for the processing 
of music-specific meaning is necessary, in turn, to exclude at least some musical 
meaning from the explanation based on one universal semiotic framework. I f  such 
a distinct music-specific kind of meaning actually exists then the semiotic approach 
to music has to create new analytical and interpretative tools in order to explain 
the whole communicative potential of music. Although language and music share 
many communicative mechanisms, I claim that they also consist of some domain- 
specific elements which have evolved because of different selective pressures. These 
elements are, in evolutionary terms, the most recent communicative innovations 
which have occurred in the Homo sapiens lineage and which are related to the 
aforesaid characteristics of the “Humboldt system” observed both in language 
and music. In my opinion, tonality belongs to these innovations in the domain of 
music.14 It does not mean that music is entirely devoid of the potential for transmit­
ting referential meaning. In fact music is a powerful means of eliciting memories, 
imagery and associations15 which are definitely propositional by their very nature. 
Apart from this, musical sounds or phrases can be used as iconic, symbolic or even 
indexical signs.16 This kind of meaning is called “designative meaning’17 or “extra­
musical meaning”.18 Moreover, there is evidence that listening to music evokes the 
event-related potential (ERP) N40019 which is an electrophysiological marker of 
conceptual (semantic20) processing.21 However, these kinds of meanings are not
14 Cf. Piotr Podlipniak, “Tonality as One of the “Music-Specific” Adaptations,” in E-pro­
ceedings of the Xllth International Congress o f Musical Signification, ed. Mark Reybrouck et al. 
(Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain and Académie Royale de Belgique, 2013).
15 David J. Hargreaves, Raymond A. R. MacDonald, and Dorothy Mieli, “How do People Com­
municate Using Music?,” in Musical Communication, ed. Dorothy Miell, Raymond A. R. MacDo­
nald and David J. Hargreaves (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-25,1-25.
16 Maciej Jabłoński, Muzykajako znak: Wokół semiotyki muzyki Eero Tarastiego, Prace Ko­
misji Muzykologicznej 11 (Poznań: Wydawn. Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1999).
17 Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music ([Chicago]: University of Chicago 
Press, 1956), 35.
18 Stefan Koelsch, “Towards a neural basis of processing musical semantics,” Physics o f Life 
Reviews, 2011, doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2011.04.004,89-105,90.
19 The N400 component in the ERP is elicited by the processing of such stimuli as words, 
environmental sounds, pictures, faces, and odors (Ibid., 92). All these stimuli are related to 
conceptually meaningful information.
20 It is worth mentioning that the term “semantics” is used here not in a narrow linguistic 
sense i.e. as lexical or propositional semantics but in a broad meaning as every semiotic relation. 
In this sense (used e.g. by Koelsch, ibid.), however, it can be applied to relations which, according 
to Reich, “[...] constitute a basic property of all cognitive systems of human beings and thus are 
relevant both for music and language — and for the whole meaningful world of human expe­
rience” (121). Yet, it seems that some meaningful experiences (such as affective or sensorimotor 
impressions) have to be excluded from these semiotic phenomena.
21 Cf. e.g. Ellen F. Lau, Colin Phillips, and David Poeppel, “A  cortical network for seman­
tics: (de)constructing the N400,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9, no. 12 (2008), doi:10.1038/ 
nrn2532.
specific solely to music and language.22 Meanwhile, various sensations of stability 
which accompany music perception seem to exemplify another, qualitatively dif­
ferent kind of meaning which represents a distinctive musical feature.23 Thus, the 
features of music which are responsible for these sensations cannot be explained 
in terms of the traditional semiotic approach (e.g. as mere Peirce’s signs: index, 
icon or symbol of something).24 One such feature is tonality.
Affective and propositional meaning 
and the evolution of vocal communication
One of the shared communicative components of music and speech 
is “expressive dynamics’25 also known as “affective prosody”.26 This form of com­
munication conveys emotional information by means of modulation of acoustic 
cues such as sound intensity, fundamental frequency (FO), and tempo.27 There is 
evidence that affective prosody is an evolutionarily old form of vocal communica­
tion which is understandable not only by all humans but also by species of other 
mammalian taxa.28 Moreover, some elements of affective prosody (e.g. intensity
22 According to some scholars, the process of semiosis can be evoked by the process of auditory 
scene analysis (Albert S. Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: The perceptual organization of 
sound (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990).) in which the smallest sound segment corresponds 
to a defined meaning (A. Frey et al., “An experimental validation of Temporal Semiotic Units and 
Parameterized Time Motifs,” Musicae Scientiae 18, no. 1 (2014), doi:10.1177/1029864913516973.). 
Frey et al (Aline Frey et al., “Temporal Semiotic Units as Minimal Meaningful Units in Music? 
An Electrophysiological Approach,” Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal 26, no. 3 
(2009), doi:10.1525/MP.2009.26.3.247.) suggest that “Temporal Semiotic Units” function as 
such minimal units at this level. ^
23 Uli Reich, “The meanings of semantics,” Physics o f Life Reviews, 2011, doi:10.1016/j. 
plrev.2011.05.012.
24 Cf. Koelsch, “Towards a neural basis of processing musical semantics,’
25 Björn Merker, “Is There a Biology of Music, and Why Does it Matter?,” in Proceedings 
o f the 5th triennial conference o f the European Society fo r  the Cognitive Sciences of Music 
(ESCOM): Hanover University o f Music and Drama, September 8 -13, 2003, ed. Reinhard 
Kopiez (Hanover: Inst, for Research in Music Education, 2003), 402-5.
26 Elke Zimmermann, Lisette Leliveld, and Simone Schehka, “Toward the Evolutionary Roots 
of Affective Prosody in Human Acoustic Communication: A  Comparative Approach to Mammalian 
Voices,” in Evolution o f Emotional Communication: From Sounds in Nonhuman Mammals 
to Speech and Music in Man, ed. Eckart Altenmüller, Sabine Schmidt and Elke Zimmermann, 
1st ed., Series in affective science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 116-32.
27 Klaus R. Scherer, “Emotion in Action, Interaction, Music, and Speech,” in Language, 
Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Striingmann Forum 
Reports, 107-139.
28 Elke Zimmermann, Lisette Leliveld, and Simone Schehka, “Toward the Evolutionary Roots 
of Affective Prosody in Human Acoustic Communication: A  Comparative Approach to Mammalian 
Voices,” in Evolution o f Emotional Communication: From Sounds in Nonhuman Mammals
and tempo) have their counterparts in the domain of gestures.29 This indicates 
additionally that affective prosody does not depend solely on vocal control. What 
characterizes this way of communication30 is its continuous (non-discrete) char­
acter.31 But language and music are complex phenomena which do not just consist 
of such a continuous ingredient.
While affective prosody constitutes an inseparable part of the suprasegmental 
level of language and music structures, the generative character of both is possible 
thanks to their segmental levels which are composed of a restricted number of 
discrete components. Since these discrete components are generatively used in 
language32 and music33, which is a specific trait of the human species, it is rea­
sonable to assume that the complexity of music and language has a hierarchical 
form whose particular elements reflect the stages of the evolution of vocal com­
munication in the Homo sapiens lineage.34 Nevertheless, the presence of affec­
tive prosody both in language and music indicates that these phenomena have 
a common evolutionary origin. In fact, many present-day theories of the origin 
of music and language assume the existence of a “protolanguage’35 or a “musi- 
language’36 as the precursors of contemporary music and language. Only the 
appearance of a discrete set of units allowed the transformation of the precursor
to Speech and Music in Man, ed. Eckart Altenmüller, Sabine Schmidt and Elke Zimmermann, 
1st ed., Series in affective science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 116-32.
29 Cf. Manfred Clynes, Sentics: The Touch of Emotions, 1st ed., A  Doubleday Anchor book 
(Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Press, 1977).
30 Iris Berent calls such a system — i.e. composed of non-discrete elements — “blending 
systems” (Iris Berent, The phonological mind (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 19).
31 Björn Merker, “Is There a Biology of Music, and Why Does it Matter?,” in Proceedings 
o f the 5th triennial conference o f the European Society fo r  the Cognitive Sciences o f Music 
(ESCOM): Hanover University o f Music and Drama, September 8-13, 2003, ed. Reinhard 
Kopiez (Hanover: Inst, for Research in Music Education, 2003), 402-5.
32 In the case of language an example of such a combinatorial system is a phonological system 
which is composed of a set of discrete building blocks — phonemes whose concatenation is based 
on some tacit combinatorial principles (Berent, The Phonological Mind, 21).
33 In the case of tonal music, the examples of discrete elements are tones which represent 
pitch classes and possess a particular duration. Thus, pitch and time relations between successive 
notes are usually treated as their distinctive features (cf. Ludwik Bielawski, “Muzyka jako system 
fonologiczny,” Res Facta, no. 3 (1968).
34 Edward J. Gorzelańczyk and Piotr Podlipniak, “Human singing as a form of bio-commu- 
nication,” Bio-Algorithms and Med-Systems, 7/14 (2011).
35 W . T. Fitch, “The biology and evolution of music: A  comparative perspective,” Cognition 
100, no. 1 (2006), doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.009.
36 Steven Brown, “The “Musilanguage” Model of Music Evolution,” in The Origins o f Mu­
sic: [consists o f papers given at a Workshop on the Origins o f Music held in Fiesole, Italy, May 
1997, the first o f a series called Florentine Workshops in Biomusicology], ed. Steven Brown, 
Björn Merker and Nils L. Wallin (Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: MIT Press, 2000), 271-300.
into the “Humboldt system”.37 As a result, both music and language consist of 
a segmental level of organization.
Yet, the segmental components of speech (phonemes) differ from those of music 
(single sounds of an established music pitch and duration called tones or notes),38 
and the discrimination of phonemes is based on another cognitive strategy differ­
ent from the discrimination of tones. The difference between music and language 
is even more conspicuous in the domain of the juxtaposition of these segmental 
components into larger entities. However, what constitutes the cardinal difference 
between music and language is the relation of these larger entities to meaning. 
The reason why the chunks of units in language, unlike in music, are connected to 
propositional meaning is, in my opinion, the different adaptive functions fulfilled 
by the syntactic relations of the elementary units of language and music.
In the semiotic tradition, the combinatorial relations between signs in formal 
structures are called “syntactics’39 or “syntax”.40 In the case of language the most 
obvious example of syntax is grammar. Despite Chomsky’s claims about the separa­
tion of grammar from semantics there is evidence that some grammatical rules are 
actually strictly connected to propositional meaning.41 In other words, in order to 
check the grammatical correctness of some expressions, a knowledge of semantics 
is necessary. In addition, the semantic restrictions of grammar indicate that gram­
matical forms can be understood as broad categories of propositional meaning. 
Even morpho-syntax whose units are deprived of propositional meaning42 leads 
eventually to the retrieval of meaning in the process of speech recognition. This 
process — i.e. the comprehension of words and larger expressions (phrases and 
sentences) — is based on the principle of semantic compositionality. The rule of 
compositionality states that “ [...] the meaning of an expression is a function of the 
meanings of its parts and the way they are syntactically combined”.43 Although in 
the process of language comprehension nonlinguistic information influences the
37 Merker, “Music: The Missing Humboldt system.”
38 Bielawski, “Muzyka jako system fonologiczny.”
39 Charles W. Morris, Foundations o f the Theory o f Signs (Chicago: The University of Chi­
cago Press, 1938).
40 Uwe Seifert et al., “Semantics of Internal and External Worlds,” in Language, Music, and 
the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann Forum Reports, 203-29.
41 Daniel Dor, “From the autonomy of syntax to the autonomy of linguistic semantics: No­
tes on the correspondence between the transparency problem and the relationship problem,” 
Pragmatics & Cognition, 8/2 (2000).
42 Since morpho-syntax is deprived of propositional meaning some authors suggest that 
actually morpho-syntax or syntax of phonology, rather than grammar, are the more relevant 
analogy of musical syntax (cf. Fred Lerdahl, “Musical Syntax and Its Relation to Linguistic 
Syntax,” in Language, Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, 
Strungmann Forum Reports, 257-272, 260).
43 Peter Hagoort and David Poeppel, “The Infrastructure of the Language-Ready Brain,” in 
Language, Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann 
Forum Reports, 233-255, 235.
interpretation of an utterance, the meaning of the lexical-syntactic frame is the 
main source of propositional meaning.
Although tonality in music is hierarchical, like phonological or grammatical 
systems in language, the tonal hierarchy is different in essence from phonological 
or grammatical hierarchies. The specific character of tonality is related to the psy­
chological representation of stability upon which every tonal hierarchy is based.44 
This means that certain tones are perceived as more stable than others. Tones in 
a well-formed tonal sequence are alternated depending on their stability. Thus, ill- 
formed tonal sequences are perceived as wrong because some more or less stable 
tones have appeared in the wrong place. In contrast, an ill-formed syllable is not 
unstable in terms of our psychological experience.45 It shows that, as Iris Berent 
observes, “ [...] despite their common reliance on hierarchical organization, musi­
cal and phonological hierarchies are different in kind”.46 The same is true as far as 
language grammar is concerned. The grammatical hierarchy in a sentence does not 
depend on feelings of stability. A  noun in a sentence is not more or less important 
in a grammatical grid due to its emotional tinge but to its propositional meaning. 
Since psychological stability is absent from all language generative systems but 
is crucial for the correctness of tonal sequence, it is reasonable to suppose that it 
is stability itself which is the main information transmitted by tonality. However, 
the feeling of stability is a positive reaction to a stimulus which is important to 
survival. Although, according to David Huron, the specific emotional reactions 
to tonal features are explained by the mechanism of misattribution,47 the unique 
character of tonal stability suggests a specific adaptive function of tonality.48 From 
this point of view tonal sequences inform us about the realization of this function. 
Yet people are usually unaware of the actual ultimate function of their behavior49 
even if they are conscious of their emotional reactions to its fulfilment. This is
44 Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff, A Generative Theory o f Tonal Music (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 1983).
45 Berent, The Phonological Mind., 31.
46 Ibid.
47 Huron claims that the fulfilled or unfulfilled predictions of stimuli cause emotional rea­
ctions due to the adaptive value of the general ability of prediction. The feeling of stability which 
accompanies the perception of tonic is incorrectly attributed to a particular tone because our 
brains have learned statistically to expect it and thus associate the feeling of stability generated 
by successful prediction with melodic context specific to the appearance of tonic (David Brian 
Huron, Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology o f Expectation, 1st ed. (Cambridge, Mass, 
London: MIT, 2006).
48 Cf. Piotr Podlipniak, “Specific Emotional Reactions to Tonal Music - Indication of the 
Adaptive Character of Tonality Recognition,” in Proceedings o f the 3rd International Confe­
rence on Music & Emotion (ICME3), ed. Geoff Luck and Olivier Brabant (Jyvaskyla: University 
of Jyvaskyla, Department of Music, 2013).
49 Candace S. Alcorta, Richard Sosis, and Daniel Finkel, “Ritual harmony: Toward an 
evolutionary theory of music,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, no. 31 (2008), doi:10.1017/ 
S0140525X08005311.
because emotion acts as an evaluative and motivational mechanism which tells 
us what we should do and what is good or bad for us rather than why it is good or 
bad.50 All in all, the feeling of stability by itself can be understood as a meaning.
Different kinds of psychological stability experienced during listening to tonal 
music are often described as emotional qualia.51 Thus, in contrast to conceptual 
meaning whose transmission seems to be the main function of language, the com­
municative content of tonal sequences consists of affective meaning which is pre- 
conceptual.52 This kind of meaning is often related to an “internal world” whereas 
propositional meaning53 is related to an “external world”.54 Importantly, tonality 
seems to be the only natural generative system whose function is to transmit affec­
tive meaning. Although people express affective meaning in speech they do that by 
means of prosody which is not generative. However, are the affective meaning of 
tonality and the propositional meaning of the lexical-syntactic frames in language 
actually different in kind? Is there any dissimilarity in the brain’s activity during 
the processing of language and tonal syntaxes?
The processing of music and language syntaxes
Although not all scholars accept that musical structure is syntactic,55 
there are studies which provide evidence for an overlap between the processing of 
music and of language structures.56 This overlap is often interpreted as evidence of
50 Cf. Marcello Mortillaro, Marc Mehu, and Klaus R. Scherer, “The Evolutionary Origin of 
Multimodal Synchronization and Emotional Expression,” in Evolution of Emotional Communi­
cation: From Sounds in Nonhuman Mammals to Speech and Music in Man, ed. Eckart Altenmül­
ler, Sabine Schmidt and Elke Zimmermann, 1st ed., Series in affective science (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 3-25.
51 Huron, Sweet Anticipation.; Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis, On Repeat: How Music Plays 
the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
52 Uwe Seifert et al., “Semantics of Internal and External Worlds,” in Language, Music, and 
the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strüngmann Forum Reports, 203-29.
53 Sometimes concepts can be used to describe an “internal world” as in the case of language 
descriptions of pain, sensations, emotions etc. However, these descriptions refer to the concepts 
of pain, sensations, and emotions while pre-conceptual affective meaning works by direct elici­
tation of emotions.
54 Ibid.
55 Justin London, “Schemas, not syntax: a reply to Patel,” in Language and music as cog­
nitive systems: [volume based on an eponymous conference, Cambridge, 11-13 may 2007, ed. 
Patrick Rebuschat, Martin Rohrmeier and John A. Hawkins (New York, N .Y: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 242-247.
56 Aniruddh D. Patel et al., “Processing syntactic relations in language and music: an event-re- 
lated potential study,” Journal o f cognitive neuroscience 10, no. 6 (1998).; Burkhard Maess et al., 
“Musical syntax is processed in Broca’s area: an MEG study,” Nature neuroscience 4, no. 5 (2001), 
doi:10.1038/87502.; Steven Brown, Michael J. Martinez, and Lawrence M. Parsons, “Music and
the existence of at least some neural resources whose specific function is syntactic 
processing and which are thus specific both to language and to music processing.57 
On the other hand, in order to process musical syntactic structure, it is necessary to 
analyze some aspects of music which are absent from language. One of them is defi­
nitely the recognition of pitch hierarchy. Apart from cognitive segmentation of a heard 
sound stream into discrete units — pitch classes, this process necessitates sequencing 
them, abstracting a pitch center, and keeping the pitch center in working memory.58 
Although analogous tasks are important for language syntax processing (segmenta­
tion of speech into discrete entities, sequencing the phonemes, syllables and words 
listened to, retrieval of syntactic and semantic information, and keeping the words in 
working memory59), the statistical analysis of subsequent events (pitch classes in the 
case of music;60 phonemes, syllables or words in the case of language) is crucial only 
for the processing of music syntax. After all, statistical analysis of events is necessary 
for the recognition of a pitch center but not for establishing whether a word is the 
object or subject etc. Even in the case of morpho-syntax, the statistics of phonemes 
and morphemes are less important for their arrangement than phonological rules and 
processes which depend on other factors,61 although the application of these rules and 
processes definitely results in some statistical regularity of phonological sequences.
The performance of all analogous tasks by the human brain is interpreted as the 
reason behind the aforementioned neuronal overlap observed between the process­
ing of music and language structures.62 However, the activity of shared neuronal
language side by side in the brain: a PET study of the generation of melodies and sentences,” 
European Journal o f Neuroscience 23, no. 10 (2006), doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2006.04785.x.; 
Evelina Fedorenko et al., “Structural integration in language and music: Evidence for a shared 
system,” Memory & Cognition 37, no. 1 (2009), doi:10.3758/MC.37.1.1.
57 Aniruddh D. Patel, “Language, music, syntax and the brain,” Nature Neuroscience 6, no. 7 
(2003), doi:10.1038/nnl082.
58 Stefan Koelsch, “Response to target article “Language, music, and the brain: a resource- 
-sharing framework”,” in Language and Music as Cognitive Systems: [volume based on an 
eponymous conference, Cambridge, 11-13 may 2007, ed. Patrick Rebuschat, Martin Rohrmeier 
and John A. Hawkins (New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 2012), 224-234, 225.
59 Peter Hagoort and David Poeppel, “The Infrastructure of the Language-Ready Brain,” in 
Language, Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann 
Forum Reports, 233-255.
60 Carol L. Krumhansl, Cognitive Foundations o f Musical Pitch, Oxford psychology series
17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
61 Michael Kenstowicz, “Phonological Rules and Processes,” in The M IT  Encyclopedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences, ed. Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil (Cambridge (Mass.) [etc.]: MIT Press, 
op. 1999), 637-639.; Berent, The Phonological Mind.
62 Patel, “Language, music, syntax and the brain,’; Stefan Koelsch, “Response to target ar­
ticle “Language, music, and the brain: a resource-sharing framework”,” in Language and Music 
as Cognitive Systems: [volume based on an eponymous conference, Cambridge, 11-13 may 
2007, ed. Patrick Rebuschat, Martin Rohrmeier and John A. Hawkins (New York, N.Y: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 224-34.
structures during the processing of music and language syntaxes does not necessar­
ily mean that these structures are dedicated merely to syntactic processing. Neither 
does this prove beyond doubt that music and language syntaxes are based on the 
same adaptive functions in terms of evolution. As has been indicated, the same 
neural structures which are active during syntax processing are also involved in 
other tasks. For example, premotor areas, mainly the ventrolateral premotor cortex, 
are activated during the prediction of sequential order.63 Similarly, Broca’s area, 
whose activity is usually associated with music and language syntax processing,64 
is also involved in other types of analysis such as mathematical tasks,65 aspects of 
action representation,66 and goal-directed behavior.67
These functional heterogeneities of cortical areas weigh in favor of the existence 
of functional neural systems dedicated to processing complex phenomena instead 
of modular organization specific solely to syntax processing. From this point of 
view, a particular neuroanatomical structure can support many different circuits 
that perform different tasks.68 Only the specificity of a given circuit’s connections 
represents the functional specificity of processing a particular complex phenomenon. 
The possible evolution of such new slightly modified (extended or reduced) circuits 
is consistent with evolutionary logic i.e. tinkering in an opportunistic way instead of 
constructing new tools from scratch.69 From the evolutionary point of view, however, 
the main question concerns the genesis of a particular circuit structure, whether its 
connectivity develops in response to genetic predispositions or it is molded mainly 
by environmental influences during ontogenesis. The ubiquity of tonal music which 
is based on a pitch hierarchy and the intuitive recognition of tonic suggest that the 
processing of music pitch organization is instinctive — i.e. at least some of the abili­
ties required for the processing activity emerged in the process of natural selection.70
63 Ibid. „
64 Luciano Fadiga, Laila Craighero, and Alessandro D ’Ausilio, “Broca’s Area in Language, 
Action, and Music,” Annals o f the New York Academy o f Sciences 1169, no. 1 (2009), doiilO.llll/ 
j.1749-6632.2009.04582.x.
65 Roland Friedrich, Angela D. Friederici, and André Aleman, “Mathematical Logic in the 
Human Brain: Syntax,” PLoS ONE 4, no. 5 (2009), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005599.
66 Fadiga, Craighero and D’Ausilio, “Broca’s Area in Language, Action, and Music,’; Etienne 
Koechlin and Thomas Jubault, “Broca’s Area and the Hierarchical Organization of Human Be­
havior,” Neuron 50, no. 6 (2006), doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.017.
67 John Duncan, “The multiple-demand (M D) system of the primate brain: mental programs 
for intelligent behaviour,” Trends in cognitive sciences 14, no. 4 (2010), http://linkinghub.elsevier. 
com/retrieve/pii/S1364661310000057.
68 Cf. Philip Lieberman, Human Language and our Reptilian Brain: The Subcortical Bases 
o f Speech, Syntax, and Thought, Perspectives in cognitive neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 6.
69 François Jacob, “Evolution and Tinkering,” Science, 196/4295 (1977).
70 Cf. Eva Jabłonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, 
Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History o f Life, Life and mind (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2005), 286.
What differentiates music syntax from language syntax, apart from structural 
differences between music and language, is the specific role of emotions in music 
syntactic organization. The emotional quality of every pitch class experience is 
necessary to establishing tonal hierarchy.71 Therefore, the difference between the 
processing of language syntax and music syntax concerns not only the type of ele­
ments processed (phonemes, syllables, words in language, tones in music) but also 
the way of inferring the syntactic function of a particular element (e.g. recognition 
of word order, inflectional endings, grammatical tone etc. in the case of language; 
statistical analysis of pitch occurrence in the case of music). In both cases, however, 
the results of the analyses allow individuals to create a sequence of expectations 
which are believed to be a source of emotional experience.72
However, the emotional reaction related to music expectancies seems to be 
much stronger than that to speech predictions. Importantly, in the process of 
speech recognition the contextually based predictions are equally important.73 Yet, 
while in the case of speech perception they are crucial for the comprehension of 
grammatical and lexical meaning, in the case of music they are used to establish 
the psychological representation of stability. This indicates that the predictions 
play another, specific function during the apprehension of music syntax. For ex­
ample, the statistically-based prediction of pitches which allows recognition of 
a particular pitch class as a pitch center is facilitated by a feeling of relaxation. 
Thus, the expectancy-based emotional assessment of a particular pitch indicates 
the syntactic function of a particular pitch. Although from the structural point of 
view, the syntactic functions of pitches are related solely to their pitch contexts,74 
the actual apprehension of pitch syntactic relations in music is based on a subtle 
coupling between emotional assessment and the analysis of pitch structure. Simi­
larly, the apprehension of the grammatical meaning of a language sentence often 
necessitates an understanding of semantics.75 However, while in the case of musical 
pitch structure its syntactic order depends on pre-conceptual emotional assess­
ment, in language syntax it is strictly connected with a conceptual and propositional 
meaning. This observation has important evolutionary implications.
71 Nikolaus Steinbeis, Stefan Koelsch, and John A. Sloboda, “The role of harmonic expectancy 
violations in musical emotions: evidence from subjective, physiological, and neural respon­
ses,” Journal o f cognitive neuroscience 18, no. 8 (2006), doi:10.1162/jocn.2006.18.8.1380.; 
Stefan Koelsch, Thomas Fritz, and Gottfried Schlaug, “Amygdala activity can be modulated by 
unexpected chord functions during music listening,” NeuroReport 19, no. 18 (2008), doi:10.1097/ 
WNR.0b013e32831a8722.
72 Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music.; Huron, Sweet anticipation.
73 Peter Hagoort and David Poeppel, “The Infrastructure of the Language-Ready Brain,” in 
Language, Music, and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann 
Forum Reports, 233-255, 234.
74 Huron, Sweet anticipation.
75 Dor, “From the autonomy of syntax to the autonomy of linguistic semantics”.
On the one hand, if the ability to recognize pitch centricity evolved earlier than 
language, it is very probable that language perception involves partly the same 
neuroanatomical structures which are necessary in pitch sequence perception. 
After all, both pitch and speech perception operate in the same modality and their 
structures serve as communicative tools. Their structural complexity necessitates 
application of extended working memory which implements sound rehearsal. In 
order to act efficiently, both systems need implicit knowledge acquired during 
their development in a cultural environment. Finally, because both systems are 
parts of culturally elaborated phenomena, the processing of pitch syntax and 
language syntax must be open to include in their systems some culture-specific 
innovations. In fact, neuroimaging studies show that non-musicians during 
rehearsal o f tonal information rely on neural structures that overlap in their 
brain topography with those involved in the rehearsal of verbal information.76 
This overlap indicates that in the course of evolution many neuronal structures 
involved in the working memory of sounds appeared useful in both speech and 
music processing. However, in musicians, who devote more time to music train­
ing than non-musicians, the aforementioned overlapping structures are activated 
more strongly compared to non-musicians.77 Apart from that, musicians rely 
during tonal rehearsals on additional neural subcomponents.78 These observa­
tions suggest that the cultural environment (i.e. musical training which consists 
in the long-term learning of associations between pitch information and motor 
schemas) can create specific cognitive strategies which are based on specific 
functional neuronal circuits. In the case of musicians who are regularly exposed 
to musically elaborated circumstances, the specificity of cognitive strategies is 
realized by including in the existing neuronal circuit new neuronal structures 
instead of creating a completely new module.
On the other hand, while the pitch hierarchy recognition involves neuroana­
tomical structures which are shared with language processing, the structural dif­
ference between music pitch sequences and speech sound organization necessitates 
at least some specific neuronal resources. First of all, tonality as a feature which is
76 Robert J. Zatorre, Alan C. Evans, and Ernst Meyer, “Neural mechanisms underlying me­
lodic perception and memory for pitch,” The Journal o f Neuroscience: the Official Journal of 
the Society fo r  Neuroscience 14, no. 4 (1994).; Stefan Koelsch et al., “Functional architecture of 
verbal and tonal working memory: An FMRI study,” Human Brain Mapping 30, no. 3 (2009), 
doi:10.1002/hbm.20550.
77 Katrin Schulze and Stefan Koelsch, “Working memory for speech and music”, An­
nals o f the New York Academy o f Sciences 1252, no. 1 (2012), doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2012. 
06447.x.
78 Katrin Schulze, Karsten Muller, and Stefan Koelsch, “Neural correlates of strategy use 
during auditory working memory in musicians and non-musicians,” European Journal o f Neu­
roscience 33, no. 1 (2011), doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2010.07470.x.
cross-culturally ubiquitous79 and easily recognizable by non-musicians80 must be 
processed by a neuronal circuit whose development does not demand elaborate 
long-term learning (like the learning of writing). It suggests that people are en­
dowed with a propensity for the development of a neural circuit dedicated to the 
processing of sound stimuli which are characterized by such occurrence of pitches 
that allows inferring a pitch center and, in consequence, creating tonal hierarchy. 
In fact, according to a neuroimaging study by Daniela Perani and colleagues,81 
neonatal neural activity depends on the pitch structure of music stimuli. In this 
study, it was only the processing of the tonal music excerpt that was characterized 
by right-hemispheric dominance similar to adult non-musicians. Interestingly, the 
differently lateralized activation of subcortical areas related to emotional process­
ing was also observed in response to different stimuli (tonal music excerpt versus 
altered music with short-lasting key shifts), which suggests that emotional as­
sessment is a part of the structural analysis of pitch order (the stimuli used in the 
study differed only in pitch organization82). All these characteristics of a functional 
neuronal specificity at such a young age (none of the neonates examined were older 
than three days) imply a developmental facilitation of structural pitch processing by 
some genetic predispositions which, in turn, suggest the functional specialization 
of the structural pitch processing.
Evidently, the processing of tonality is a complex phenomenon which involves 
many sub-processes, among which pitch hierarchy recognition is only one element. 
As a matter of fact, in the complex music phenomena tonally stable pitches co-occur 
with metrically stable temporal positions creating a tonal-metric hierarchy.83 How­
ever, the fact that a tonal hierarchy is observed also in free rhythm music suggests 
the relative autonomy of this hierarchy. Moreover, tonally stable pitches facilitate 
the recognition of on-beat position in the bar whereas temporal position seems to 
have no effect on tonal assessment.84 This observation suggests that a pitch structure 
is probably a more important musical feature as a source of stability sensation. All
79 Nicholas Bannan, “Harmony and its role in human evolution,” in Music, Language, and 
Human Evolution, ed. Nicholas Bannan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 288-339, 
309-310.
80 Carol L. Krumhansl, “The Cognition of Tonality — as We Know it Today,” Journal o f New 
Music Research 33, no. 3 (2004), 253-268.
81 Daniela Perani et al., “Functional specializations for music processing in the human new­
born brain,” Proceedings of the National Academy o f Sciences 107, no. 10 (2010), doi:10.1073/ 
pnas.0909074107.
82 Ibid., 4759.
83 Jon B. Prince and Mark A. Schmuckler, “The Tonal-Metric Hierarchy,” Music Perception: 
An Interdisciplinary Journal 31, no. 3 (2014), doi:10.1525/MP.2014.31.3.254.
84 Jon B. Prince, William F. Thompson, and Mark A. Schmuckler, “Pitch and time, tonality 
and meter: How do musical dimensions combine?,” Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance 35, no. 5 (2009), doi:10.1037/a0016456.
these aforesaid characteristics of tonality suggest that the circuit connections which 
are responsible for the processing of tonal relations are domain-specific. This means 
that these connections represent a functionally specialized unit.
Tonality and semiotics
What does the knowledge of processing and functional specificity of tonality 
tell us about its semiotic character? First of all, if the function of tonal structure 
is to highlight group cohesion by means of sensation of stability, tonal relations 
can be understood as indexes. In such a case, the sensations of stability are the 
direct effects of group consolidation. Thus, there is a causal relation between the 
state of cohesion and experienced emotions of stability which are communicated 
by means of music pitch structure. Importantly, the process of communication is 
realized here without any conceptual analysis. However, such an interpretation 
can cause some problems. For example, according to Stefan Koelsch, the analysis 
of harmonic context gives rise to so called “intra-musical” meaning.85 Because 
“intra musical” meaning is not referential, it is neither indexical86 nor iconic. For 
the same reason it is also not symbolic.87
Koelsch admits, however, that “ [...] the structural relations of musical events 
can also lead to emotional responses (such as surprise, increase in tension, etc.) 
[...]’88 which, according to Koelsch, represent another type of meaning namely “mu­
85 Koelsch, “Towards a neural basis of processing musical semantics,”, 95-96.
86 According to Koelsch, “[...] intra-musical meaning is not the iconic meaning (or a metap­
horical meaning) of extra-musical concepts such as “build-up”, “extent”, “stability”, etc., but the 
meaning emerging from harmonic integration due to the establishment of a structural model, 
its modifications, etc.” (99).
87 Some authors e.g. Scherer and Zentner suggest that certain “[...] suprasegmental features 
seem to carry emotional information primarily through symbolic coding [italics original], as based 
on a process of historically evolved, sociocultural conventionalization” (Klaus R. Scherer and Mar­
cel R. Zentner, “Emotional Effects of Music: Production Rules,” in Music and Emotion: Theory 
and Research, ed. Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, Series in affective science (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 361-392, 364). However, feelings of stability which are 
specific to the experience of tonal relations depend both on conventions (pitch classes statistics 
characteristic of a particular musical idiom) and the species-specific cognitive mechanism of pitch 
structure prediction which functions independent of culture (cf. Huron, Sweet Anticipation.). 
Thus, different emotions of stability which are experienced during listening to tonal relations 
are neither entirely conventional nor arbitrary and, because of that, they cannot be understood 
as symbols. Of course it is possible that some tonal relations become symbols similar to words 
in language (e.g. key categories can act as a symbolic emotional code cf. Jaroslaw Mianowski, 
“On Three Paradigms of Emotional Communication in Music,” Interdisciplinary Studies in 
Musicology, 2008). In such a case, however, the meaning of the tonal relations in question is 
extra-musical. Importantly, the symbolic meaning of tonal relations does not exchange for, or 
annihilate, their intra-musical meaning.
88 Koelsch, “Towards a neural basis of processing musical semantics”, 99.
sicogenic” meaning.89 Nevertheless, the emotional responses of stability are, in my 
opinion, not only inseparable from the experience of music syntax but, because they 
determine the comprehension of tonal relations, they are actually a part of music 
syntax processing. In other words, we know that a perceived pitch class or chord 
is tonic not because of the conceptual analysis of the pitch structure but because 
of the feeling of stability which accompanies the perception of such a pitch class 
or a chord.90 This explains the intuitive and pre-attentional character of tonality 
perception. Thus, the meaning evoked by tonal relations should be interpreted 
as at least partly affective. Musical affective meaning is sometimes understood 
as iconic.91 The reason for such a semiotic interpretation of emotional content of 
music comes from the assumption that music does not express emotions but mim­
ics them.92 In fact, even if music really mimics93 something, it is more likely to be 
other vocal expressions of emotions rather than emotions themselves. Moreover, 
insofar as it is possible to search for imitations among the so called “music per­
formance features,” tonal relations do not resemble any human (or nonhuman) 
vocal expressions. As far as the expressive character is concerned, the means by 
which tonality elicits emotion is unique. Because of that, no tonal relation can be 
understood as an icon of a particular emotion.94
89 Ibid., 100.
90 This clearly does not exclude the possibility that, apart from the intuitive recognition 
of tonal relations, some people (e.g. musicologists, musicians) are able to conceptualize them.
91 Cf. e.g. Klaus R. Scherer and Marcel R. Zentner, “Emotional Effects of Music: Production 
Rules,” in Music and Emotion: Theory and research, ed. Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, 
Series in affective science (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 361-92, 364; see 
also Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism o f Reason, Rite, 
and Art, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
92 One such assumption is evident in the so called “contour theory” (Peter Kivy, The Corded 
Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
93 The problem of music’s emotional mimicry is related to the debate between cognitivists 
and emotivists i.e. theoretical statements concerning the question whether music only expres­
ses emotions or elicits them directly (Stephen Davies, “Philosophical Perspectives on Music’s 
Expressiveness,” in Music and Emotion: Theory and Research, ed. Patrik N. Juslin and John 
A. Sloboda, Series in affective science (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23-44.). 
In the case of mimicry emotional reaction to music is due to association between musical elements 
and that what is imitated, e.g. expression of sadness. However, in the light of contemporary 
knowledge of cognitive mechanisms responsible for emotional reactions to music — that the 
processing of emotions during listening to music involves many different brain mechanisms (cf. 
Patrik N. Juslin et al., “How Does Music Evoke Emotions? Exploring the Underlying Mechanisms,” 
in Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, Applications, ed. Patrik N. Juslin and 
John A. Sloboda, Series in affective science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 605-42.) 
— any general statement which explains the connection between music and emotions by means 
of one mechanism is a dangerous simplification.
94 Note that no tonal relation can be understood as a symbol of stability either. Although there 
is an arbitrary component of tonal relations (there are different statistics of tone occurrences in 
music of various cultures thus the same sequences of tones may cause slightly different emotional
Another semiotic explanation of music’s emotional communication refers to 
indexes. In fact, from a broad perspective emotional reactions are always caused 
by some circumstances which are important for an organism. In general, the 
fundamental biological function of emotions is to assess and control the survival 
value of the organism’s interactions with the environment.95 In other words, where 
there is emotion there is something important for an organism. Therefore, every 
emotional reaction can be understood as an index. Because particular musical 
features are a direct effect of an experienced emotion, these features can be un­
derstood as indexes of this emotion. There is however, another problem with 
postulating the indexical character of tonality, which is related to the legitimacy 
of the application of the semiotic framework mentioned at the beginning of this 
article. The emotional experience of music is pre-conceptual. This means that the 
phenomenon of music as a whole, or at least some of its components, precedes 
symbolic communication.96 The more so, according to some scientists,97 since 
music in its contemporary complex form evolved as a parallel branch to language98 
rather than being a direct language predecessor, as was suggested by Darwin.99 In 
this perspective, the music-specific features — e.g. pitch syntax — are biological 
innovations of vocal communication which evolved separately from (and probably 
simultaneously with) language-specific traits such as morpho-syntax or prepo­
sitional semantics. Thus, although certain authors suggest that every meaning 
might be generally referred to as a sign’s processes,100 the lack of direct connec­
tions between pre-conceptual experience of tonality and the conceptual character 
of other meanings raises doubts about the justifiability of such a reference. It 
seems that the process of communication by means of pre-conceptual mode differs
effect depending on cultural experience (cf. Huron, Sweet Anticipation.)) which can suggest that 
they have a symbolic character, the actual mechanism of eliciting the emotion of tonal stability 
is independent of culture (Krumhansl, Cognitive Foundations o f Musical Pitch.; Huron, Sweet 
Anticipation.). Thus, one cannot describe e.g. pitch center (tonic) as a conventional sign as it is 
in the case of words.
95 Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions, 
Series in affective science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 48.
96 Per A. Brandt, “Music and How We Became Human-a View from Cognitive Semiotics: 
Exploring Imaginative Hypotheses,” in Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis o f Hu­
man Companionship, ed. Stephen Malloch and Colwyn Trevarthen (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).
97 Cf. e.g. Fitch, “The biology and evolution of music: A  comparative perspective.”
98 There are, however, scholars who treat language as a specific kind of music (Anthony 
Brandt, Molly Gebrian, and L.R. Sieve, “Music and Early Language Acquisition,” Frontiers in 
Psychology 3 (2012), doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00327.
99 Charles Robert Darwin, The Descent o f Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: 
John Murray, 1871).
100 Uwe Seifert et al., “Semantics of Internal and External Worlds,” in Language, Music, 
and the Brain: A Mysterious Relationship, ed. Michael A. Arbib, Strungmann Forum Reports, 
203-29,123.
qualitatively from the conceptual one. Even if, as Ian Cross proposes, music is an 
exaptation101 which is used nowadays, among other ways, as a tool of emotional 
manipulation,102 (in such a case the musical sounds can be understood as in­
dexes of the emotional state of a person who creates a tonal pitch sequence) the 
pre-conceptual character of this communication means that the message is not 
conceptually interpreted by the receiver as an index.103 Thus, the interpretation 
of tonal message is based on another rule, other than the interpretation of, e.g., 
fever as an index of illness.
Is there any possible use of a semiotic framework as an explanation of com­
munication by means of tonal relations? It seems that the only way of applying 
a semiotic framework in the research of tonality is to understand signs only in 
a purely functional sense independent of the process of interpretation. Such a point 
of view is, however, inconsistent with traditional semiotics which presupposes 
that the generation of meaning is based on different kinds of reasoning, namely 
induction, deduction, and abduction.104
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